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Abstract 
This study investigates the determinants of the various components of
debt—short- and long-term debt and their categories—in the case of nonfinancial
listed firms in Pakistan for the period 2008–10. We make a significant distinction
between these determinants depending on the components of debt issued: long-term
or short-term forms of debt. Our results show that large firms are more likely to
have access to long-term debt borrowing than small firms and that, due to supply
constraints, small firms resort to short-term forms of debt. Firms with higher
potential for growth prefer using less long-term debt as well as debt with fewer
restrictive arrangements in order to become more financially flexible. Firms with
sufficient fixed assets can generate external finance more easily and at lower cost
by using these assets as collateral, which supports the tradeoff theory. Firms
generating high levels of profit, however, may choose to finance their investments
using internal resources rather than by raising debt finance, which conforms to the
pecking order theory. Our results also confirm the presence of the inertia effect and
industry-specific effects, and are robust to alternative estimation techniques.  
Keywords: Long-term debt, short-term debt, growth, firm size,
profitability, Pakistan. 
JEL Classification: G32, G15, F23. 
1. Introduction 
The behavior of corporations in making capital structure decisions
is of considerable interest to financial economists. A firm’s capital structure
comprises different components of debt and equity—a mix of financing
that maximizes returns and minimizes risk is known as an optimal capital
structure. Capital structure policy, therefore, involves identifying the
different factors that determine an optimal capital structure, and entails 
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making tradeoffs between risk and returns. High levels of debt financing 
may increase expected returns but they also carry a high risk of default on 
the repayment of debt. 
Of the two schools of thought on capital structure, the first argues 
that there can be an optimal capital structure while the second, led by 
Modigliani and Miller (1958), argues the opposite. The first school holds 
that a firm can mix its debt and equity in a proportion that minimizes risk 
and maximizes the firm’s returns and value. It proposes that firms should 
consider various factors when deciding on a specific capital structure, i.e., 
the relevance theory of capital structure. The second school supports the 
idea that different levels of capital structure offer the same level of risk and 
return, i.e., that capital structure does not matter and should not be 
considered as the firm’s value is determined by its underlying investment 
decisions (Brealey & Myers, 1996). The theory of the irrelevance of capital 
structure holds on the basis of certain assumptions, e.g., no transaction 
costs, no taxes, symmetric information, and no bankruptcy cost. When 
these assumptions do not hold, capital structure decisions become relevant 
in financing decisions. 
Since Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) influential study on the 
irrelevance of capital structure in investment decisions, a large body of 
theoretical literature has developed capital structure models under 
different assumptions. Some theories are based on traditional determinants 
such as tax advantage and the bankruptcy cost of debt, e.g., the tradeoff 
theory, while others apply modern financial economics and use an 
asymmetric information or game theory framework in which debt or 
equity is used as a signaling tool or strategy choice.  
Theories that have been widely tested empirically include the 
tradeoff theory, pecking order theory, agency cost theory, and signaling 
information (for an excellent review of the literature on capital structure, 
see Frank & Goyal, 2003; Harris & Raviv, 1990). In addition, firms may find 
that the availability of external financing is restrictive and that the cost of 
different types of external finance may vary. Firms will try to select levels 
of debt and equity in order to reach an optimal capital structure in such an 
imperfect environment. However, there is little consensus on how firms 
select their capital structure, and the factors that influence components of 
capital structure are still largely unexplored. 
Our main aim is to analyze the impact of selected factors—growth 
or investment opportunities, firm size, profitability, and tangibility—on the 
capital structure of firms listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) (see 
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Harris & Raviv, 1990; Rajan & Zingales, 1995). For a more in-depth analysis 
of the determinants of capital structure, we divide debt element into short- 
and long-term debt and their categories to indicate the sensitivity of the 
above factors to whichever debt component has been selected by the firm. 
While both short- and long-term debt components are used in corporate 
financial decisions, our analysis is based solely on long-term forms of debt, 
which provides a focused insight into the mechanics that operate 
Pakistan’s financial and corporate sectors.  
We attempt to provide empirical justifications for some of the 
theories on capital structure in Pakistan’s context. In this regard, the study is 
an important contribution to the literature because it tries to identify the 
presence of the inertia effect in leverage decisions by applying dynamic 
panel models. We assess cross-industry differences in leverage choices by 
introducing industry dummies into leverage models. Above all, we 
investigate whether, in Pakistani firms, the determinants of the level of debt 
differ significantly depending on which element of debt is being examined. 
The study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the empirical 
literature on capital structure. Section 3 discusses the methodology and 
data used. Our empirical results are presented in Section 4, and Section 5 
concludes the study. 
2. A Review of the Literature  
This section reviews briefly several key theories of capital structure, 
and their results when empirically tested: (i) the pecking order theory, (ii) 
the static tradeoff hypothesis, and (iii) agency theory. It then summarizes 
some of the literature on the determinants of capital structure. 
2.1. Theories of Capital Structure 
The pecking order model tested by Myers and Majluf (1984) shows 
that the use of private information is the only source through which firm 
managers seek to issue risky and overpriced securities, as a result of which 
an outside investor will demand a higher rate of return on equity than on 
debt. Myers (1977) has argued that the pecking order model does not 
explain firms’ dividends distribution. However, when firms choose to pay 
dividends for other reasons, pecking order choices should affect dividend 
decisions. This is explained by the argument that it is not desirable for 
firms to finance investment with new risky securities and dividends are 
less attractive for firms with less profitable assets with large current and 
future expected investments and high debt. However, if external financing 
4 Attiya Yasmin Javid and Qaisar Imad  
 
becomes necessary when internally generated funds are not enough to pay 
dividends or to finance growth-oriented investment, the model 
hypothesizes that firms with a low risk of financial distress will issue direct 
conventional debt; firms with a medium risk of financial distress will issue 
hybrid securities—such as convertible debt or preference shares; and firms 
that are high-risk due to financial distress will issue external equity. 
The pecking order theory suggests that firms use a ranked structure 
to select sources of external financing (as mentioned above) only because the 
amount of mispricing and loss of wealth to shareholders both depend on the 
type of security issued. The amount of loss is lowest for debt and highest for 
external equity because new information affects the value of a security. The 
new information will have the least effect on the value of debt because debt 
holders have first priority on a firm’s income and assets. However, new 
information will have the most effect on the value of equity because equity 
holders have a claim on the firm’s residual income and assets. 
Additionally, the pecking order theory postulates that debt 
increases when investment exceeds retained earnings and decreases 
otherwise. In this context, Fama and French (2002) empirically test and 
compare its hypothesis with that of the tradeoff model. Their results 
suggest that more profitable firms are less levered, which is consistent with 
the pecking order model. They also show that firms with greater 
investment opportunities are less levered, as postulated by the tradeoff 
theory. Myers (1977) suggests that, according to the pecking order theory, 
firms do not have debt targets; rather, their current and expected future 
financing costs set desired targets that can be modified. Firms expecting 
more investment opportunities may have less debt, but this may change 
over time when, for example, net cash flows are sucked up by debt.  
The static tradeoff theory has been extensively tested empirically 
around the argument that the expected increase in tax-shield benefits from 
issuing debt finance may neutralize the cost of financial distress, such as 
cash flow volatility, the cost of expected bankruptcy in the case of default, 
and the threat of lack of cash. The theory suggests that the maximum debt is 
determined by equating the corporate tax-saving advantage of debt with 
the deadweight cost of bankruptcy (Barclay & Smith, 1999; Bradley, Jarrell, 
& Kim, 1984; DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980; Myers, 1977). Miller (1977) and 
Graham and Harvey (2001) argue that the tax saving is large and sure while 
the bankruptcy cost seems to be very small, indicating that firms should 
have more debt compared to their leverage level. Further, Myers (1977) has 
argued that this theory should provide an important insight into optimum 
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capital structure decisions in terms of tax shields, although he finds that the 
tax effects are very small when tested empirically.  
From the standpoint of the static tradeoff theory, firms that are 
more profitable should issue more debt because they have more profits to 
protect from taxation. However, some studies have criticized this argument 
as higher profitability means lower expected costs of financial distress and, 
moreover, firms use more debt relative to book assets (Fama & French, 
2002; Myers, 1984; Titman & Wessels; 1988). The tradeoff theory postulates 
that larger and more mature firms use more debt while managers are 
agents of shareholders and their interests may be in conflict with those of 
shareholders such that debt is considered a controlling device. Bankruptcy 
is costly for managers since they can be displaced and thus lose their job 
benefits. Therefore, debt can mitigate agency conflict between shareholders 
and managers, an idea put forward by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Jensen 
(1986), and Hart and Moore (1988). There may also be agency conflicts 
between shareholders and debt-holders (Myers, 1977).  
Agency theory provides another explanation for why debt can be 
used as a controlling mechanism in agency costs between managers and 
shareholders—creditors may act as monitors of managers’ investment 
decisions. However, these capital structure decisions do not necessarily 
control agency costs—the agency cost of debt comprises the problem of 
excessive dividends, issuance of senior ranking debt, asset substitution, 
and underinvestment (Smith & Warner, 1979), which measure the 
possibility of bankruptcy and restructuring the debt and the cost of 
monitoring debt agreement. A firm with higher debt financing is more 
likely to have an agency cost of debt.  
Firm managers are owners who try and transfer wealth from 
bondholders to shareholders; in this situation, the use of incentive 
contracts, such as options, is best suited to mitigating the problem. The 
empirical literature shows that the more profitable firms issue more debt to 
control managerial self-interest behavior. Agency theory suggests that 
growth firms should have less debt while firms that have more future 
profitable investment prospects need less debt. Regulated firms have fewer 
agency problems so that debt is not needed to discipline their management.  
2.2. Determinants of Capital Structure 
A large body of empirical research attempts to identify the most 
significant determinants of optimal structure but the findings differ due to 
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variations in context and the components of capital structure that are 
considered. Rajan and Zingales (1995) analyze the capital structure of 
nonfinancial firms in the G-7 countries, and identify a positive relationship 
between tangibility and leverage; the market-to-book value and 
profitability are negatively related to debt. Bevan and Danbolt (2000) 
examine the capital structure of 822 British companies, and find a positive 
relationship between the market-to-book ratio and nonequity liabilities-to-
total assets ratio, but a negative relationship between the book value of 
adjusted debt-to-adjusted capital ratio. The market-to-book ratio has no 
impact on the book values of total debt-to-total assets ratio and debt-to-
capital ratio, while the market-to-book ratio has a significant negative 
relationship with all forms of the market values of capital structure. Bevan 
and Danbolt also find that firm size has a positive relationship with the 
book values of all forms of capital structure, while profitability and 
tangibility have a negative relationship with both the book and market 
values of all measures of capital structure. They conclude that tangibility 
has a significant positive relationship with the book and market values of 
debt-to-total asset ratio and adjusted debt-to-adjusted capital ratio, but no 
significant relationship with the debt-to-capital ratio. 
The empirical literature on emerging markets shows that, as with 
developing markets, firm size has a mixed relationship with leverage. 
Oyesola (2007) and Chen (2004) conclude that firm size is positively 
related to total debt and short-term debt, but negatively related to long-
term debt. Suhaila and Wan Mahmood (2008), Ramlall (2009), Chen 
(2004), and Baral (2004) find that there is a negative association between 
firm size and total debt, while Teker, Tasseven and Tukel (2009) show 
that firm size and the ratio of depreciation to operating profit has no 
relationship with capital structure.  
Profitable firms do not rely much on external debt (Chen, 2004; Liu 
& Ren, 2009; Oyesola, 2007) and vice versa, and firms with a high 
tangibility ratio can easily access debt by offering tangible securities to their 
creditors (Liu & Ren, 2009; Oyesola, 2007; Suhaila & Wan Mahmood, 2008). 
However, Ramlall (2009) and Teker, Tasseven, and Tukel (2009) put 
forward slightly different results, showing that profitability is positively 
related only to long-term liabilities and short-term loans, and negatively 
related to the other components of capital structure.  
Tangibility impacts capital structure negatively in the case of total 
liabilities and short-term liabilities, whereas it affects tangibility 
positively in the case of long-term liabilities, long- and short-term leases, 
long- and short-term loans, and long-term debt. Serrasqueiro and Nunes 
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(2008) find that tangibility is not a significant determinant of capital 
structure. The nondebt tax shield and dividends have a positive 
relationship with leverage (Oyesola, 2007); the nondebt tax shield is 
positively related to the short-term debt ratio but negatively related to the 
long-term debt ratio (Chen, 2004; Ramlall, 2009; Serrasqueiro & Nunes, 
2008; Suhaila & Wan Mahmood, 2008). Growth opportunities have a 
weak relationship with capital structure (Liu & Ren, 2009; Oyesola, 2007; 
Serrasqueiro & Nunes, 2008; Suhaila & Wan Mahmood, 2008), although 
Chen (2004) documents a positive relationship and Baral (2004) identifies 
a negative relationship between the two.  
In analyzing other determinants of capital structure, Suhaila and 
Wan Mahmood (2008) find a negative relationship between the liquidity 
(quick ratio) and interest coverage ratio (the ratio of net income before taxes 
and dividends to interest expenses) and debt. However, there is a weak but 
statistically significant relationship between income variability and capital 
structure. Chen (2004) reports that the cost of financial distress as 
represented by a firm’s earning volatility has a very weak relationship with 
capital structure. Baral (2004) concludes that business risk, the dividend 
payout ratio, debt service capacity, and degree of operating leverage, are 
minor contributors to leverage. Finally, Serrasqueiro and Nunes (2008) find 
that the level of risk is not a significant determinant of capital structure. 
2.3. Capital structure in the Pakistani firm context  
The research on the Pakistani market’s capital structure is very 
limited. Ilyas (2005), Shah and Hijazi (2004), and Shah and Khan (2007) 
have examined the capital structure of nonfinancial firms listed on the KSE. 
Shah and Khan reveal the existence of a positive relationship between 
tangibility and capital structure. Firm growth and profitability are negative 
but not statistically significant contributors to capital structure, while firm 
size has a very weak and statistically insignificant impact on capital 
structure. In addition, earning volatility and nondebt tax shield have no 
relationship with capital structure. Shah and Hijazi show that tangibility 
has no impact on, but that firm size has a positive relationship with 
leverage while growth and profitability have a negative relationship.  
Ilyas (2005) points out that firms’ profitability has a negative 
relationship with leverage, as do size and growth. The study’s results show 
that there is a positive relationship between the nondebt tax shield and 
leverage, but that this relationship and the degree of financial leverage has 
a negative relationship with capital structure. Rafiq, Iqbal, and Atiq (2008) 
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investigate the determinants of capital structure for Pakistan’s chemical 
sector for the period 1993–2004, and conclude that firm size, profitability, 
income variations, nondebt tax shield, and growth are the important 
determinants of capital structure in that sector. 
Cheema, Bari, and Siddique (2003) summarize the country’s 
corporate growth history, providing an overview of the ownership and state 
of the financial market and its dynamics. They highlight the salient features 
of the ownership structure of Pakistan’s top 40 listed companies. The 
country’s main companies are family-controlled business groups, followed 
by the state, and affiliates of multinational corporations (Cheema et al., 2003; 
Javid & Iqbal, 2008, 2010). This concentration of ownership on one hand and 
underdevelopment of the financial market to provide external finance on the 
other pushes firms to rely on retained earnings or on borrowing from the 
informal sector (Javid & Iqbal, 2007).  
The energy and chemicals sector rely on issuing equity for external 
financing and on short-term debt. Booth, Aivazian, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Maksmivoc (2001) point out that the use of short-term financing is greater 
than that of long-term financing in developing countries (including in 
Pakistan). It would be interesting to find out whether or not different 
categories of debt are affected by different factors in the case of Pakistan’s 
manufacturing sector.  
3. Methodology and Data 
Using panel data estimation techniques, this study investigates the 
determinants of capital structure and its components for 77 nonfinancial 
firms listed on the KSE for the period 2008-10. We extend the methodology 
suggested by Rajan and Zingales (1995), who highlight the contribution of 
four factors in determining debt decisions at the firm level (in their case, for 
G-7 countries using a cross-section analysis for 1991): (i) market-to-book 
ratio, firm size, profitability, and tangibility. Our study includes different 
components of leverage and examines the effect of these traditionally 
selected determinants on those components. This section describes the 
dataset, and discusses the rationale for the various dependent and 
independent variables used and the manner in which they are calculated. 
3.1. Data and Sample  
The data for this study has been taken from annual reports of 
nonfinancial firms listed on the KSE. The sample comprises 77 of the KSE’s 
Decomposition Analysis of Capital Structure in Pakistani Manufacturing  
 
9 
listed nonfinancial firms1 for the period 2008–2010. These firms have been 
selected based on the criteria that they are representative of each sector, 
and were active and continuously listed during the period of analysis. The 
firms’ annual reports were retrieved from their official websites. The study 
has also used the Business Recorder’s website for firms’ average stock prices 
in order to calculate their market value.  
This section describes the sets of dependent and explanatory 
variables and their construction, the selection of which draws on the 
theoretical literature on capital structure in financial economics and the 
empirical evidence discussed in Section 2 (see Bevan & Danbolt, 2000; 
Harris & Raviv, 1990; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Shah & Hijazi, 2004). 
3.2. Dependent Variables  
The leverage or gearing ratio is defined as the debt-to-equity ratio. 
Alternative measures of leverage are determined by different firm-specific 
factors. To examine the sensitivity of the definition of the leverage variable, 
it is important, therefore, that this variable be constructed by alternative 
definitions of leverage suggested in the empirical literature (Rajan & 
Zingales, 1995). Decomposing the individual firm’s leverage would give 
more insight into the factors that influence the components of leverage and 
the extent of their influence in determining corporate financial structure. 
Thus, we decompose debt into four components at book value.2  
Nonequity liabilities-to-total assets (LV1) is defined as the ratio of 
long-term debt (LTD) plus trade credit and equivalent (TTCE) to total 
assets (TA).3 This measure is used as a proxy for the firm’s liquidation 
value. However, Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that this measure may be 
somewhat inflated because trade credit and equivalent belong to financing 
transactions rather than assets. 
                                                     
1 These firms constituted 80 percent of the KSE’s market capitalization in 2007. Note that we have 
included nonfinancial firms because there is a difference between their capital structure and that of 
financial firms, and a combined analysis of both might not present a true picture. 
2 The debt-to-equity ratio based on book values reflects firms’ past financial choices, whereas the 
ratio’s market value indicates their future choices (Frank & Goyal, 2003). Fama and French (2002) 
point out some inconsistencies arising from the use of two different debt ratios: they observe that 
both the pecking order theory and static tradeoff theory apply to the book value of the ratio, and 
there are doubts if the predictions can be extended to the debt market value. 
3 At book value, DE1 = (TD + TTEC)/TA. 
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Debt-to-total assets (LV2) is the simple ratio of long-term debt at 
book value (LTD) to total assets (TA).4 
Debt-to-capital (LV3) is obtained by dividing long-term debt (LTD) 
by capital, where capital is calculated as long-term debt plus equity capital 
and reserves (ECR) and preference shares (PS).5  
Adjusted debt-to-adjusted capital (LV4): This ratio is obtained by 
dividing adjusted debt by adjusted capital. Adjusted debt is calculated by 
deducting total cash and equivalents (TCE) and marketable securities (MS) 
from long-term debt. Similarly, the book value of adjusted debt is 
calculated as the book value of long-term debt and capital plus provision 
(PROV) and deferred taxation (DTAX) less intangible assets (INTANG).6  
These four components of the debt-to-equity ratio capture the key 
elements of capital structure. Therefore, the study focuses on the above 
four measures of leverage and examines their determinants. 
3.3. Independent Variables 
Although the factors determining capital structure components can 
be controversial (see Harris & Raviv, 1990; Titman & Wessels, 1988), we 
follow Rajan and Zingales (1995) and adopt four independent variables 
that are traditionally considered key.  
3.3.1. Growth 
The market-to-book ratio is used to capture the growth 
opportunities that exist for the firm. A negative relationship is expected to 
exist between growth potential and the level of debt. This is consistent with 
the agency theory proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and also with 
Myers’s (1977) argument concerning information asymmetry, i.e., that 
firms with high levels of debt may have the possibility of not exercising 
care with good investment opportunities. Therefore, firms with large 
investment opportunities would likely have low debt-to-equity ratios. 
Moreover, as growth opportunities do not promise immediate revenue, 
firms may be unwilling to take on large contractual liabilities at the time.  
                                                     
4 DE2 = TD//TA 
5 DE3 = TD//(TD + TCR + PS) 
6 DE4 = (TD – TCE – MS)//(TD + ECR + PS + PROV + DTAX – INTANG) 
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Growth opportunities are, essentially, intangible and, therefore, 
may be considered limited collateral value or liquidation value to firms. 
Those with greater growth potential may not be interested in seeking debt 
or in finding additional debt-financing sources. However, the empirical 
evidence regarding the relationship between debt and growth 
opportunities is inconclusive. Many studies find a negative relationship 
between the two (see Barclay, Smith, & Watts, 1995; Chung, 1993; Rafiq et 
al., 2008; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Shah & Hijazi, 2004; Titman & Wessels, 
1988), which bears out the argument of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
Myers (1977), and is consistent with the view that firms with high levels of 
growth opportunity can be expected to have low levels of debt.  
Kester (1986) does not find any evidence for the expected negative 
relationship between growth opportunities and debt decisions, while 
Delcoure (2007) and Rafiq et al. (2008) come up with a positive relationship 
between the growth and leverage. It is expected that firms with more 
growth opportunities have higher leverage. Based on this argument, our 
first hypothesis is:  
There is a positive relationship between growth opportunities and leverage. 
In this study, the market-to-book ratio is used as a measure for 
firms’ growth opportunities or investment opportunities.7 The market-to-
book ratio (growth) ratio is calculated as the book value of total assets less 
the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by the 
book value of total assets.  
3.3.2. Firm Size 
The logarithmic transformation of sales is used as a measure for firm 
size in the theoretical literature; there is no explanation to support how the 
size of the firm affects its debt decisions. The inconclusive relationship 
between size and debt may be accounted for by the nature of large firms 
who leave fewer chances to fail, making it possible to measure size as the 
logarithm of net sales, which, if inverted, can be used as the probability of 
bankruptcy (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). Larger firms are more likely to have a 
credit rating and thus have available to them nonbank debt financing, 
which is usually unavailable to smaller firms. This would imply a positive 
relationship between firm size and leverage (Titman & Wessels, 1988).  
                                                     
7 Firms’ growth opportunities are measured by different proxies in the empirical literature, e.g., the 
market-to-book value of equity, research-expenditure-to-total-sales measure, and annual percentage 
increase in total assets (Titman & Wessels, 1988).  
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The opposing view is that there is less asymmetric information 
about larger firms, reducing the chances of the undervaluation of new 
equity issues, and encouraging large firms to use equity financing. This 
means that there should be a negative relationship between size and 
leverage (Frank & Goyal, 2003; Rajan & Zingales, 1995). The empirical 
evidence with regard to the relationship between size and debt is 
inconclusive: Rajan and Zingales (1995), Bevan and Danbolt (2000), Shah 
and Hijazi (2004), and Rafiq et al. (2008) find firm size to be significantly 
and positively related to leverage. Size is expected to have a positive 
coefficient since larger, more diversified, firms are likely to have lower 
bankruptcy, and be able to sustain a higher level of debt (Agrawala & 
Nagarajan, 1990; Ferri & Jones 1979; Scott & Martin, 1975). Larger firms are 
expected to have more leverage. This leads us to our second hypothesis: 
There is a positive relationship between the size and leverage of a firm. 
Firm size (size) is measured by taking the natural log of its sales. 
3.3.3. Profitability 
There are mixed opinions about a firm’s profitability and its debt 
decisions. The supply-side argument suggests that the more profitable 
firms would have more debt available to them, and that the demand for 
debt is negatively associated with profitability. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) 
argue that an information asymmetry prevents lenders from distinguishing 
between good and bad risks ex ante and that a variable interest rate cannot 
be charged depending on their risk type. In this case, creditors would 
charge an increased interest rate, which would generate the problem of 
adverse selection since low risks would quit the market due to the high 
cost of borrowing. Therefore, firms will tend to favor internal to external 
sources of finances due to this information asymmetry.  
Modigliani and Miller (1963) suggest that, as taxes are paid after 
interest payments, firms may favor debt over equity, and the more profitable 
firms will select high levels of debt to gain more favorable tax shields. 
However, Miller (1977) has later criticized his and Modigliani’s (1963) 
arguments by taking account of the effect of personal taxation. Moreover, 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argue that some firms have other tax shields 
such as depreciation, and may not find interest tax shields as attractive.  
The pecking order argument presented by Myers and Majluf (1984) 
and Myers (1984) is that information asymmetry pushes firms to favor 
internal over external capital sources, which is why firms that are more 
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profitable will choose to finance investments through retained earnings 
rather than through external debt. Toy, Stonehill, Remmers, Wright, and 
Beekhuisen (1974), Kester (1986), Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), Tong and Green (2005), and Rafiq et al. (2008) also support 
the negative association between profitability and debt in line with the 
pecking order theory. Thus, the more profitable firms are expected to have 
less leverage. Our third hypothesis, therefore, is: 
There is a negative relationship between the profits and leverage of a firm. 
The firm’s profitability (profit) is obtained by dividing its earnings 
before interest and taxes (EBIT) by its total assets. 
3.3.4. Tangibility of Assets 
The more fixed assets a firm owns, the better its chances are of 
easily obtaining external financing at a low cost since it can use these assets 
as collateral to secure debt (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). Bradley et al. (1984), 
Titman and Wessels (1988), and Rajan and Zingales provide evidence of a 
positive relationship between debt and asset tangibility. The static tradeoff 
approach also suggests that firms with greater fixed assets can obtain more 
external debt by using these assets as collateral.  
The pecking order theory, however, suggests that firms with low 
levels of fixed assets will also face problems of information asymmetry, 
pushing them to raise more debt rather than equity since they can only 
issue equity if it is underpriced (Harris & Raviv, 1990). Contrary to this 
argument, large firms have greater fixed assets and are in a better position 
to issue equity at a fair price. Therefore, they do not need debt to finance 
new investment. It is expected that firms with a higher percentage of fixed 
assets will have higher debt ratios. Thus, our fourth hypothesis is: 
There is a positive relationship between asset tangibility and firm leverage. 
We measure tangibility as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets.  
The determinants of leverage and its four components are described 
by equation (1) given below, which follows Rajan and Zingales (1995) and 
Bevan and Danbolt (2000). 
itititititit TangSizeofitGrowthLev   43210 Pr  (1) 
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LEVit represents leverage or gearing ratio and various components 
of leverage, which are explained by the following factors: Growth 
(growthit), size (sizeit), profitability (profitit), and tangibility (tangit). These 
variables are measured on the basis of their book values taken from the 
sampled firms’ financial statements.  
3.4. Estimation Technique 
In the first stage, we apply a panel data analysis technique to 
examine the extended leverage models, which will allow us to capture firm 
heterogeneity (if any) over time. Firm-specific effects are not taken into 
account in the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation.8 Making the 
empirical model a more general panel data equation and using the set of 
explanatory variables—growth, size, profitability, and tangibility—a more 
general, unrestricted, equation would be written as 
ititititittiit TangSizeofitGrowthLev   43210 Pr  
(2) 
The intercept has three parts: β0, which is common to all firms and all 
time periods; μi, which represents firm-specific intercepts; and λt, which 
refers to time-specific intercepts. The term μi represents those unobservable 
effects that are specific to the firm but common to all time periods, λt 
represents those effects that are specific to particular time periods but 
common to all firms, β0 
is the mean of all these unobservable effects, and εit is 
the error term representing all those unobservable effects that vary both over 
time and across cross-section units. The βs are slope parameters, which we 
assume are constant over time as well as across firms and industries.  
In the second stage, we estimate a series of dynamic panel leverage 
models to find out whether previous debt decisions affect firms’ current 
debt choices. Finally, we introduce industry-specific dummies into the 
model to capture any cross-industry differences.  
4. Empirical Results 
Our panel data analysis estimates the determinants of four leverage 
components for 77 firms from 2008 to 2010. Table A1 in the Appendix gives 
summary statistics on the four components and four determinants of 
leverage, and the correlation matrix is presented in Table A2.  
                                                     
8 Firm-specific effects are omitted under pooled OLS estimation. In such a case, if the unobservable 
individual-specific effects are correlated with the explanatory variables, then OLS estimates will be 
biased (Hsiao, 2003).  
Decomposition Analysis of Capital Structure in Pakistani Manufacturing  
 
15 
Before carrying out the panel estimations, it is necessary to examine 
the data and choose an appropriate estimation technique. Important issues 
to address are whether the data is stationary or has a unit root; whether 
individual effects exist, or if the model should estimate a pooled equation 
with a common intercept and slopes. If there are individual effects, we need 
to determine if they are period-specific or cross-section-specific or both, and 
if the unobserved individual effects are fixed constant or randomly 
distributed independent of the explanatory variables. We also need to 
resolve any multicollinearity, autocorrelation, or heteroscedasticity. 
The time period under study is short (three years) compared to the 
cross-section unit (77) so that a unit root test is not required. We begin by 
testing for individual effects and two-way fixed effects: Cross-section and 
time series are estimated first, followed by period-specific effects alone, 
cross-section-specific effects alone, and estimation with the application of a 
common intercept. The analysis consists of four models based on four 
components of leverage to investigate its determinants. 
4.1. Test for Data and Models 
To test for individual effects, the following three types of restrictions 
can be imposed on the above, unrestricted, specification of the models given 
in equation (2), i.e., to consider only time-specific effects and assume that 
there are no cross-section-specific effects and test the following hypothesis: 
0...: 3210  NH   
If the F-test with 1N  and KTN 2)1(   degrees of freedom is 
significant, the null hypothesis will be rejected and we will have to estimate 
a model with cross-section-specific terms. The second restriction that can be 
imposed is to treat time-specific effects as equal to 0, and consider a model 
with only cross-section-specific effects and test the following hypothesis: 
 
TH   ...: 3210  
If the F-test with 1T  and KTN 2)1(   degrees of freedom is 
significant, the null hypothesis will be rejected and we will have to consider 
time-specific effects in our estimation model. However, if the F-statistic 
appears to be insignificant, then time-specific effects can be ignored. The 
final restriction is to treat the model as a common effects model with neither 
time- nor cross-section-specific effects and test the following hypothesis: 
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0...,0...: 3213210  TNH   
If the F-test with )1()1(  TN  and KTN 2)1(   degrees of 
freedom is significant, the null hypothesis can be rejected and the common 
effects model would be an incorrect choice. 
In order to estimate individual effects, we first estimate two-way 
fixed effects followed by period-specific effects alone, cross-section-specific 
effects alone, and estimation with a common intercept. The results of the 
redundant fixed effects are presented in Table 1.  
Table 1: Individual effects test 
Effects test Statistic d.f. Prob. Conclusion 
Cross-section F-statistic 
Period F-statistic 
Cross-section/Period F 
statistic 
63.13 
6.46 
61.61 
(76, 148) 
(2, 148) 
(78, 148) 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Reject H0 of redundancy  
Reject H0 of redundancy  
Reject H0 of redundancy  
Cross-section F-statistic 
Period F-statistic 
Cross-section/period F 
statistic 
37.24 
3.78 
36.59 
(76, 148) 
(2, 148) 
(78, 148) 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Reject H0 of redundancy  
Reject H0 of redundancy  
Reject H0 of redundancy  
Cross-section F-statistic  
Period F-statistic 
Cross-section/period F 
statistic 
87.54 
4.42 
85.54 
(76, 148) 
(2, 148) 
(78, 148) 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Reject H0 of redundancy  
Reject H0 of redundancy  
Reject H0 of redundancy  
Cross-section F-statistic  
Period F-statistic 
Cross-section/period F 
statistic 
79.58 
6.61 
77.76 
(76, 148) 
(2, 148) 
(78, 148) 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Reject H0 of redundancy  
Reject H0 of redundancy  
Reject H0 of redundancy  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Both the F-test and the likelihood function (chi-square test)9 
indicate the presence of cross-section fixed effects and period effects. 
Thereafter, separate tests are conducted. In one case, the unrestricted 
model is that with only cross-section fixed effects; in the second case, the 
unrestricted model is with only period effects. The results strongly suggest 
using a model with only cross-section effects and, therefore, we proceed 
with a model that has cross-section-specific but no period-specific effects. 
                                                     
9 The chi-square tests (not reported here) also support the existence of cross-section-specific and 
time-specific effects.  
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Having decided to estimate a model with cross-section-specific 
unobservable effects, our next task is to determine whether these effects are 
fixed constant correlated with the other explanatory variables (a fixed 
effects model) or randomly distributed independent of the explanatory 
variables (a random effects model). In this analysis, the cross-section units 
are larger than the time period, so care is taken when deciding between a 
fixed effects and random effects model.10  
The Hausman (1978) test is used to choose between a fixed effects 
model and a random effects model. The null hypothesis of the Hausman 
test states that there is no significant difference between the coefficients of 
fixed and random effects estimators.11 Rejecting the null hypothesis would 
imply that at least some of the explanatory variables are correlated with the 
individual-specific effects. To perform the Hausman test, a random effects 
specification is estimated and the null hypothesis of independent individual 
effects tested using chi-square statistics. The results of this test are presented 
in Table 4, and indicate that the null hypothesis is rejected if the p-value is 
less than 0.05—we therefore estimate a fixed effects model. If the Hausman 
specification test had generated a p-value greater than 0.05, then the null 
hypothesis would have been accepted, proposing that a random effects 
model was more suitable. 
As regards multicollinearity, the results of the correlation matrix 
(Table A2 in the Appendix) indicate that the values of all the correlation 
coefficients between the model’s explanatory variables are not very high. 
The coefficient covariance matrix given in Table A3 in the Appendix clearly 
indicates that there is no significant relation between the coefficients 
because the coefficient of covariance between most of the variables is small. 
The White heteroscedasticity test is applied before final estimation 
to check for heteroscedasticity, first, by estimating a fixed effects model, 
                                                     
10 With a finite time period and large cross-section units as in this analysis, there is much difference 
in the estimated parameters of fixed or random effects models compared to cases where the time 
series is large and the two models give approximately the same results (Hsiao, 2003). 
11 Fixed effects estimators are consistent if the cross-section-specific effects are correlated with the 
explanatory variables and the random effects are inconsistent and biased. But the random effects 
are consistent and the fixed effects are inconsistent if the individual-specific effects are 
independently and randomly distributed of the explanatory variables. Thus, the key factor to 
consider is whether or not the individual effects are correlated with the explanatory variables. The 
chi-square test for the difference in estimates is 
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and, then, using the results to reject the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity. Therefore, in the final estimation, the problem of 
heteroscedasticity will have to be taken into account by estimating the 
White heteroscedasticity of the adjusted covariance matrix. 
4.2. Results of Panel Data Analysis 
We begin the panel data analysis by examining the effects of four 
factors in determining the four types of components of leverage. The 
results for four simple leverage models given in equation (2) are presented 
in Table 2 below. 
Table 2: Determinants of capital structure components  
(fixed effects model) 
Variable 
Nonequity 
liabilities-to-
total assets  
Debt-to-total 
assets 
Debt-to-
capital 
Adjusted debt-
to-adjusted 
capital 
Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Growth –0.03 
(–0.91) 
–0.03* 
(–2.41) 
–0.08* 
(–6.40) 
0.09 
(0.73) 
Size 0.11* 
(8.45) 
0.05* 
(8.47) 
0.05** 
(1.88) 
0.02* 
(2.79) 
Profitability –0.10* 
(–15.05) 
–0.03** 
(–3.05) 
–0.10* 
(–2.54) 
0.18* 
(2.06) 
Tangibility 0.52* 
(10.37) 
0.56* 
(15.31) 
0.56* 
(10.31) 
0.50* 
(5.48) 
C –0.52* 
(2.39) 
0.44* 
(–3.46) 
–0.20 
(0.82) 
–0.03 
(–0.79) 
Hausman  
(p-value) 
6.43 
(0.15) 
8.23 
(0.08) 
5.66 
(0.03) 
16.69 
(0.00) 
R2 0.67 0.68 0.62 0.34 
Note: The covariance matrix is White heteroscedastic-adjusted; t-values are given in 
parentheses below coefficients. Asterisk(s) * and ** indicate significance at 1 and 5 percent, 
respectively. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The results of the Hausman specification test in Table 2 indicate that 
the fixed effects model best fits the data in all categories of leverage. The 
regression results for the nonequity liabilities-to-total assets ratio show that 
growth opportunities are not related to short-term leverage. Profitability has 
a negative relationship with the nonequity liabilities-to-total assets ratio. 
Tangibility and firm size both have a strong, positive, and statistically 
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significant relationship with the dependent variable. The results also imply 
that the more profitable firms use less debt, especially short-term trade 
credit, since this debt ratio is adjusted to short-term trade credit.  
The results for the determinants of debt-to-total assets and debt-to-
capital are similar: Growing and profitable firms have less leverage 
whereas larger firms with greater tangible assets use more debt. The 
adjusted debt-to-adjusted capital ratio has no relationship with growth 
opportunities, size, or profitability, while tangibility and size have a strong, 
positive relationship with this category of leverage. The adjusted debt-to-
adjusted capital ratio has a negative relationship with growth 
opportunities, size, and profitability, while tangibility and size have a 
strong positive relationship with the dependent variable.  
The first hypothesis is not borne out by all the components of debt 
because growth opportunities are not positively linked to leverage. Earlier 
studies have also shown inconclusive evidence in this regard. Hijazi and 
Tariq (2006) and Rafiq et al. (2008) find a positive relationship between 
growth and leverage, whereas Shah and Hijazi (2004) find a negative 
relationship. The hypothesis that the more profitable firms use less 
leverage is confirmed by the first three categories of debt with the 
exception of the adjusted debt-to-adjusted capital ratio. This result 
provides empirical evidence in support of the pecking order hypothesis—
that firms prefer to finance their operations through internal sources, 
followed by external debt and equity financing—and Shah and Hijazi 
(2004), Hijazi and Tariq (2006), and Rafiq et al. (2008) conclude the same.  
The hypotheses that firm size and asset tangibility are positively 
associated with leverage are also confirmed by all components of debt. These 
results are in line with those of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) 
whose tradeoff theory suggests that firms with greater fixed assets can use 
those assets as collateral and, therefore, issue more debt. Shah and Hijazi 
(2004) generate the same results. The firm size and leverage relationship is in 
line with the bankruptcy cost theory on leverage, i.e., that the fixed direct 
costs of bankruptcy constitute a smaller portion of the firm’s total value and, 
thus, larger firms are willing to take on more debt because of the smaller 
chances of their going bankrupt. These results do not, however, confirm 
Rajan and Zingales’s (1995) argument concerning less asymmetric 
information about large firms, suggesting that new equity issue will not be 
underpriced and that large firms will, therefore, issue more equity. 
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4.3. Results of Dynamic Panel Models 
In the second stage, we estimate a series of dynamic panel models 
for all four categories of leverage to examine the inertia effect on firms’ debt 
choices (Table 3). Firms that previously relied more heavily on debt are 
thought to follow the same trend, and the lagged leverage term is added to 
the set of explanatory variables. The Hausman specification test confirms 
that the fixed effects model fits the data well in the case of all four models.  
Table 3: Determinants of capital structure components  
(dynamic panel model) 
Variable 
Nonequity 
liabilities-to-
total assets  
Debt-to-total 
assets 
Debt-to-
capital 
Adjusted debt-
to-adjusted 
capital 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Leverage (–1) 0.75 
(4.75) 
0.61* 
(3.76) 
0.83* 
(11.48) 
0.94* 
(3.69) 
Growth –0.02 
(–1.21) 
–0.01*** 
(–1.66) 
–0.08* 
(–3.08) 
0.09 
(0.16) 
Size 0.11* 
(6.26) 
0.04* 
(3.63) 
0.05* 
(2.13) 
0.09* 
(2.71) 
Profitability –0.10* 
(–2.27) 
–0.10** 
(–1.88) 
–0.10* 
(–2.02) 
–0.09* 
(–2.56) 
Tangibility 0.52* 
(10.40) 
0.24* 
(11.42) 
0.12* 
(9.13) 
0.25* 
(2.72) 
C –0.87* 
(–12.27) 
–0.39* 
(–3.46) 
–0.20 
(0.95) 
0.31 
(4.58) 
Hausman  
(p-value) 
880.70  
(0.00) 
858.50 
(0.00) 
567.60 
(0.00) 
557.70 
(0.00) 
R2 0.67 0.68 0.85 0.34 
Note: The covariance matrix is White heteroscedastic-adjusted; t-values are given in 
parentheses below coefficients. Asterisk(s) *, **, and *** indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10 
percent, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Lagged leverage has a positive and statistically significant 
relationship with all categories of debt, confirming the presence of the 
inertia effect in firms’ debt choices. The determinants follow the same 
pattern among all forms of debt as obtained from the ordinary panel 
analysis with fixed effects. Both firm size and tangibility have a positive 
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relationship while profitability and growth opportunities have a negative 
relationship with the three components of debt; adjusted debt-to-adjusted 
capital shows no association between growth opportunities and leverage. 
These results show a clear distinction compared to long-term forms of debt 
and indicate that, for Pakistani firms, the determinants of the level of debt 
differ significantly depending on which element of debt is being examined. 
4.4. Results of Panel Model Using Industrial Dummies 
Since the Hausman specification test has confirmed the presence of 
fixed effects in cross-section units and no time-specific effects, we construct 
dummy variables to capture industry-specific effects for nine industries. 
These variables take a value of 1 for a particular industry and 0 otherwise. 
Of the nine industries, the tyres and wheels sector is used as a base category 
(D9). The remaining dummies are (i) D1 (oil and gas), (ii) D2 (chemicals and 
fertilizer), (iii) D3 (engineering), (iv) D4 (automobiles), (v) D5 (cement), (vi) 
D6 (paper and board), (vii) D7 (textiles), and (viii) D8 (refineries).  
The results of this regression indicate that tangibility is positively 
and profitability negatively associated with leverage in all four forms, 
supporting the pecking order hypothesis. However, growth opportunities 
have a negative link with the first three components of debt and a positive 
relationship in the case of adjusted debt-to-adjusted capital. Size has a 
negative relationship with leverage when debt is defined as nonequity 
liabilities-to-total assets or debt-to-capital, and a positive relationship when 
it is defined as debt-to-total assets or adjusted debt-to-adjusted capital. The 
results of almost all the industrial dummies are significant, confirming the 
presence of individual effects in fixed form. These results indicate the 
robustness of the findings in that the traditional determinants play a role in 
debt decisions but are different among different components of debt. 
Overall growth opportunities have a weak relationship with all 
components of capital structure except for the fourth component, i.e., 
adjusted debt-to-adjusted capital. The insignificant parameter on growth 
indicates that firms’ growth opportunities have no impact on debt, which is 
contrary to expectations. Firm size has a positive and significant 
relationship with two components of capital structure, i.e., the long-term 
debt-to-total assets ratio and long-term debt-to-capital ratio; and a negative 
relationship with two other components, i.e., the nonequity liabilities-to-
total assets ratio and adjusted debt-to-adjusted capital ratio. This result is 
consistent with the argument that larger firms have greater access to loans 
but, at the same time, require more financing for their operations.  
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Table 4: Determinants of capital structure components  
(model with industrial dummies) 
Variable 
Nonequity 
liabilities-to-
total assets  
Debt-to-total 
assets 
Debt-to-
capital 
Adjusted debt-
to-adjusted 
capital 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Growth –0.07* 
(–11.52) 
–0.04* 
(–10.91) 
–0.20 
(–9.74) 
0.07 
(3.66) 
Size –0.11* 
(–4.61) 
0.04* 
(8.60) 
0.02* 
(–3.18) 
0.22* 
(10.87) 
Profitability –0.16* 
(–13.10) 
–0.15* 
(–5.15) 
–0.29* 
(–3.48) 
–0.30* 
(–4.98) 
Tangibility 0.36* 
(16.89) 
0.53* 
(31.61) 
0.44* 
(8.70) 
0.06* 
(2.24) 
D1 0.04 
(0.03) 
0.17* 
(18.49) 
0.21* 
(7.00) 
–0.61 
(–6.35) 
D2 –0.21* 
(–3.88) 
0.05* 
(3.62) 
0.14* 
(11.74) 
–0.45* 
(–3.85) 
D3 –0.16* 
(–13.10) 
0.01 
(0.72) 
–0.10* 
(–2.02) 
–0.11 
(–0.85) 
D4 –0.15* 
(–2.71) 
0.02 
(0.68) 
0.38* 
(2.28) 
0.59* 
(5.31) 
D5 –0.27* 
(–5.62) 
–0.04* 
(2.43) 
0.07* 
(2.33) 
–0.48* 
(–4.01) 
D6 0.41* 
(9.00) 
–0.01 
(0.35) 
0.07* 
(7.57) 
–0.41* 
(–3.72) 
D7 –0.27* 
(–7.10) 
0.06* 
(2.34) 
0.11* 
(14.21) 
–0.15 
(–1.28) 
D8 0.38* 
(7.40) 
0.01 
(0.55) 
0.14* 
(7.21) 
0.34* 
(–2.31) 
C –0.48 
(–1.73) 
0.01 
(0.98) 
–0.10 
(–0.67) 
–1.26* 
(–4.36) 
R2 0.62 0.64 0.30 0.34 
Notes: The covariance matrix is White heteroscedastic-adjusted; t-values are given in 
parentheses below coefficients. Asterisk * indicates significance at 1 percent. 
Industry dummies are introduced for nine sectors: D1 = oil and gas, D2 = chemicals and 
fertilizers, D3 = engineering, D4 = automobiles, D5 = cement, D6 = paper and board, D7 = 
textiles, D8 = refineries, and D9 = types and wheels. D9 is used as a reference category.  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 4’s results identify a negative relationship between 
profitability and all the components of capital structure. This implies that 
high-profit firms prefer internal to external sources to finance their 
operations. This result is consistent with the pecking order hypothesis, 
which states that firms will finance their operations in a specific order of 
preference, i.e., internal sources, followed by external sources of 
financing. Our results also reveal that tangibility has a strong positive 
relationship with all components of capital structure, indicating that firms 
with greater fixed assets will have more access to short- and long-term 
loans since they can use those assets as collateral against loans. 
Our analysis of these components of debt underscores the 
importance of considering both long- and short-term debt and their 
determinants as separate categories. Therefore, an analysis of the 
determinants of debt based on total liabilities does not clarify the significant 
differences between long- and short-term debt, as documented by Van der 
Wijst and Thurik (1993), Chittenden, Hall, and Hutchinson (1996), and 
Barclay and Smith (1999). Our results reveal that the determinants of the 
level of debt issued by nonfinancial KSE-listed firms vary significantly 
depending on which component of leverage is being analyzed. We find that 
firm size is positively related to long-term debt rather than short-term debt 
forms. The fact that small firms are found to borrow in the short term rather 
than in the long term may indicate that they are supply-restricted since they 
do not have access to long-term borrowing.  
The parameters on all the other most disaggregated debt elements 
are insignificant, and the relationship between the adjusted debt-to-
adjusted capital ratio, trade credit and equivalents, and the market-to-
book ratio is negative and significant. Therefore, firms with strong future 
growth opportunities will prefer to finance themselves using internal 
enterprise credit rather than through more formal means. This conforms 
to Barclay and Smith’s (1999) observations, who suggest that, when 
looking for debt financing, firms with high levels of growth potential 
prefer short- to long-term debt, as well as debt with fewer restrictive 
agreements to allow them more financial flexibility. These results 
concerning the different categories of debt are consistent with the 
findings of Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Bevan and Danbolt (2000).  
Adjusted debt-to-adjusted capital comprises mostly long-term debt 
components, whereas the nonequity liabilities-to-total assets measure 
includes elements of short-term liabilities, in particular trade credit, the 
major component of debt for the average KSE-listed nonfinancial firm. The 
24 Attiya Yasmin Javid and Qaisar Imad  
 
decomposition results reveal that the positive relationship between the 
market-to-book ratio and the nonequity liabilities-to-total assets ratio is due 
to the short-term nature of this measure. This confirms the hypothesis that 
the significant differences between debt measures and their determinants 
imply that the expected theoretical relationships in corporate financing 
depend on which component of debt is under investigation. The results 
confirm the presence of the inertia effect in debt decisions. The significant 
industry dummies indicate that debt decisions depend on the sector being 
considered.  
5. Conclusion 
This study has analyzed capital structure in detail by carrying out 
panel data regressions for 77 nonfinancial firms for the period 2008–2010. 
We have examined four components of capital structure: the ratios of (i) 
nonequity liabilities to total assets, (ii) debt to total assets, (iii) debt to 
capital, and (iv) adjusted debt to adjusted capital. Growth opportunities 
have a weak relationship with two components of capital structure—the 
ratio of long-term debt to total assets and that of long-term debt to 
capital—while the ratio of nonequity liabilities to total assets has a 
positive relationship and that of adjusted debt to adjusted capital has a 
negative relationship with a firm’s growth potential.  
Firm size has a positive and significant relationship with the long-
term debt-to-total assets ratio and long-term debt-to-capital ratio; and a 
negative relationship with the nonequity liabilities-to-total assets ratio 
and adjusted debt-to-adjusted capital ratio. This result can be justified 
with the argument that larger firms have greater access to loans but 
require more resources to finance their operations.  
We have identified a negative relationship between profitability 
and all four components of capital structure, indicating that high-profit 
firms prefer to finance their operations through internal rather than 
external sources. This result is consistent with the pecking order theory, 
which postulates that firms arrange to finance their operations in a 
specific order of preference, i.e., initially through internal sources and 
then through external sources.  
Reflecting Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) and Myers’ (1977) trade-
off theory, our study reveals that tangibility has a strong positive 
relationship with all components of capital structure. This result shows 
that firms with greater fixed assets will have more access to short- and 
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long-term loans because they can use these fixed assets as collateral. Our 
main findings suggest that an analysis of debt based solely on long-term 
debt does not provide a clear understanding of how firms make financial 
decisions; a complete picture of the determinants of capital structure 
requires a more rigorous analysis of all forms of corporate debt. Our 
results confirm the presence of the inertia effect and industry-specific 
effects, and are robust to alternative estimation techniques.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Summary statistics 
Leverage 
 Mean Median Stan. dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Lev1 0.38 0.33 0.27 3.65 23.99 
Lev2 0.21 0.15 0.21 2.52 13.18 
Lev3 0.35 0.26 0.32 2.48 13.77 
Lev4 0.48 0.36 0.45 2.14 9.85 
Explanatory variables 
Size 9.61 9.55 0.75 0.15 3.11 
Growth 1.51 1.33 0.81 1.57 5.71 
Profitability 0.18 0.13 0.22 1.86 8.50 
Tangibility 0.47 0.46 0.29 1.11 5.74 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Table A2: Correlations 
 Lev1 Lev2 Lev3 Lev4 Size Growth Profit. Tang. 
Lev1 1.000 - - - - - - - 
Lev2 0.539 1.000 - - - - - - 
Lev3 0.325 0.556 1.000 - - - - - 
Lev4 0.275 0.314 0.419 1.000 - - - - 
Size 0.233 –0.117 0.026 0.205 1.000 - - - 
Growth –0.021 –0.152 –0.105 –0.053 0.103 1.000 - - 
Profit. –0.262 –0.434 –0.288 –0.196 0.296 0.546 1.000 - 
Tang. 0.129 0.619 0.542 0.073 –0.161 –0.030 –0.175 1.000 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Table A3: Coefficients of covariance 
 Lev1 Lev2 Lev3 Lev4 Size Growth Profit. Tang. 
Lev1 0.076 0.044 0.031 0.029 0.069 –0.011 –0.011 0.039 
Lev2 0.044 0.044 0.040 0.003 0.004 –0.028 –0.013 0.044 
Lev3 0.031 0.040 0.104 0.021 –0.019 –0.038 –0.020 0.040 
Lev4 0.029 0.003 0.021 0.204 0.095 0.014 –0.014 –0.014 
Size 0.069 0.004 –0.019 0.095 0.568 0.063 0.019 –0.035 
Growth –0.011 –0.028 –0.038 0.014 0.063 0.661 0.058 –0.019 
Profit. –0.011 –0.013 –0.020 –0.014 0.019 0.058 0.050 –0.011 
Tang. 0.039 0.044 0.040 –0.014 –0.035 –0.019 –0.011 0.083 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
